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THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES IN INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION
Burt Neubornet
As many of you know, I have spent a good part of the last
twenty years as both a law professor and a litigator for the American
Civil Liberties Union. Over those years, I have harbored a heretical,
but not a particularly novel, belief that the political spectrum is
much better represented as a circle than a line; and that libertarians
at both ends of the spectrum are often much closer to each other
than to the people in the middle. I suspect that there is a great unity
of interest among many of us who labor in the libertarian groves,
even though we may differ very dramatically on particular issues and
the means to our shared ends.
Let me raise with you the problem of judicial precedent. The
question of how one construes the Constitution before the courts
act, of course, poses no problem. Each branch does the best it can.
But assume with me, if you will, that the Supreme Court has acted in
a way that is indisputably, formally complete. People may disagree
or agree with the correctness or incorrectness of the Court's decision, but the court has laid down an intelligible and finite rule. The
question now is "What is the duty or obligation of the other two
branches of government with respect to the precise rule established
by the holding of the Supreme Court?"
There are two polar positions in response to this question. We
heard John Harrison beautifully expound the first polar position a
moment ago. He argued that precedent, even Supreme Court precedent, is nothing but a prediction of future consequences. The
government, as any other actor in the legal system, must take into
account the prediction of future consequences because it is likely to
be haled into court and shellacked if it fails to follow the precedent.
As a matter of self-interest, the government ought to, and probably
will, comply with the precedent; but no formal legal obligation exists compelling the government to abide by Supreme Court precedent. That theory, and it is a respectable theory, flows from a hard
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and sharp reading of Marbuty v. Madison.' Under this view, the
Court's power to expound the law in the first place flows from the
power to decide a case; deciding a case is essentially an in-house
judicial function. While, of course, the courts should continue, inhouse, to perform as they think they should, this does not necessarily mean that the two other branches of the government, the executive and the legislature, are obliged to defer to the judgments of the
courts when they are performing their, respective, in-house duties.
This theory leaves us, if it is in fact a correct interpretation of what
the Constitution permits or even requires, with a cacophonous Constitution; a Constitution that speaks with many mouths simultaneously to the populace; the judicial construction is "correct" because
it is the last construction, not because it is the construction that one
is legally obligated to follow.
I argue for the polar position on the other side; I believe that as
long as the Court's decision complied with the formal constraints of
Marbury, as long as it satisfied the Article III case or controversy
requirements, then judicial precedent should be treated as creating
a positive duty to comply. It should be treated as the enunciation of
a positive rule of law and not simply a rule of prediction.
Let me make four quick distinctions before we talk a little bit
more about what that duty to comply might look like. First, I want
to distinguish the notion of duty from the notion of sanction. We
are not talking about making every violation of a precedent a contempt of court. That, I think, would be an extraordinary enhancement of judicial power and very bad policy. We are simply asking
whether or not there is some formal, legally recognizable duty to
comply with precedent, leaving aside the question of sanction.
Second, I want to distinguish the government from private persons, because we may have a very different theory defining the way a
private person ought to relate to a Supreme Court precedent, as
opposed to the way one of the other branches of government, one
of the states, or a local government should relate to precedent. I
would like to talk only about the duty of a government official and
the way he or she should relate to precedent.
Third, let me distinguish a legal duty to comply with precedent
from the right to criticize the precedent and the right to try to foster
change by any lawful means-by relitigating the issue or by attempting to overrule it through the legislature or by constitutional
amendment. There cannot be any principled argument that says:
"Once the Supreme Court acts, everybody has to roll over and accept what they say as correct." Criticism and attempts to change
1
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and foster re-litigation are part of the system and should be encouraged. There can be no argument from judicial precedent that,
as a principled matter, would cast any doubt upon the legitimacy of
such criticism.
Finally, let me reiterate the difference between holding and dictum. Dictum can never be any more than a predictive phenomenon. Dictum cannot be read as creating positive law because it goes
beyond the Article III powers of the courts in the first place.
Although dictum may give a hint as to what courts will do in the
future, and thus allow efficient ordering of conduct, it cannot be
read, and should not be read, as creating a positive duty to obey. So
we are talking only about the narrow precedential holding of a case.
My thesis is that once you have a narrow precedential holding
in a case, there is a legal duty on the part of the organs of government to defer to the Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution or
the statute. Such a legal duty flows, not from realpolitik, or from fear
of losing if forced into court again, but from a positive legal obligation to comply with the law as it is enunciated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to the mandates of Article III and Marbury v. Madison.
Let me stress that there is a limited practical difference between
the two polar positions. I would expect that whether one views it as
a matter of realpolitik or a matter of legal obligation, in the vast bulk
of situations you are going to have compliance. Although it is an
important matter of legal theory, and it can be quite important
pragmatically to individuals in a number of cases, one ought not exaggerate the practical consequences of accepting either position
here. We are not talking about a breakdown of the rule of law under
either theory. We are, however, talking about a very important dispute about what the theory should be. Finally, there may be nuances as between the executive and the legislative branch. Since
there can be no argument that people should be forced to refrain
from activity that would permit the relitigation of important issues,
you may well have a slightly different obligation if you are a legislator than if you are in the executive branch. There may be nuances
in the degree of compliance that is required.
With those qualifications, let me quickly sketch the consequences of thinking about precedent solely as a predictive device,
and then ask whether or not those consequences are required by the
Constitution. I will suggest that they are not required; indeed, they
are forbidden by the Constitution.
The first consequence of treating precedent as solely predictive
is a dramatic decline in the ability of the Constitution and statutes to
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exert serious effect on pre-event, primary behavior. 2 I think all of us
agree that law acts best when it acts without the necessity of formal
enforcement. The moment that you abandon the notion that the
law, as expounded by the Supreme Court, creates a legal duty to
obey, then there are at least three, and perhaps more, equally legitimate expositors of what the law is. At that point you have a
cacophonous set of voices directed to the public. It is virtually impossible to expect the Constitution or a statute to affect primary behavior in a significant way under cacophonous circumstances
because the people who are trying to align their behavior in accordance with what they understand the law to be are being told three
different things by three different bodies, each of which has legitimate authorization. The situation is even worse than the cacophonous regime we abandoned as unworkable under Swift v. Tyson. 3 A
jurisprudence that hopes to use law to influence primary, pre-event
behavior cannot succeed if it cannot speak with a single authoritative voice.
Second, and I think equally important, the other function of law
is to ascribe consequences to behavior after the event. Think for a
moment of what the consequences of a non-acquiesence position
would be in the area of post-event behavior. It would mean that
anybody with the resources to seek a second judicial opinion could
go into court and enjoy the benefit of the rule of law as expounded
by the Supreme Court. But those segments of the society that lack
the resources or sophistication to get access to the courts would be
obliged to live under whatever set of rules they can afford access to,
which means essentially what the executive says the law is. That
means that the nature of the justice that would be dispensed in the
society would often be a function of the resources of the individuals
in the society. I suggest to you that a theory of law that says that the
law depends on how much money you have and not on a uniform,
self-executing duty to comply, is fundamentally inconsistent with
our values.
Only a very naive theory of law could argue for such a result.
You have to believe that there is always a single, objectively correct
interpretation of a statute or a single, objectively correct interpretation of the Constitution to which all three branches have an equal
right to attempt to repair. I suppose one can think of the Constitution as that type of naive document, but I know of no one who thinks
2
My use of"pre-event" and "post-event" behavior is drawn from Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965). My argument is set forth in
more detail in Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent (Perspectives on the
Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions), 61 TUL. L. REv. 991 (1987).
3 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
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that there is a single right answer to hard cases. Once we admit that
interpretation and choice enters into the equation of statutory construction and constitutional law, it seems to me that the jurisprudential underpinning of compelling the kind of cacophonous jurisprudence that I have just described is impossible. The Constitution may not require one or the other. We probably have a choice.
We can decide whether we want a cacophonous Constitution or one
that speaks through a single judicial voice. It seems to me that
based on the law's role in influencing pre-event and assessing postevent behavior, there really is only one choice, and that is to view
the word of the Supreme Court as positive law, until it is changed.

